Arash Ghorbani; Mohammad Reza Abbaszadeh
Abstract
Using a sample including 2642 observations of 2003-2016 annual data of firms listed in Tehran Security Exchange, this study investigates the implications of correlation between non-discretionary accruals and partitioning variables when testing the positive accounting theories hypotheses. In earnings ...
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Using a sample including 2642 observations of 2003-2016 annual data of firms listed in Tehran Security Exchange, this study investigates the implications of correlation between non-discretionary accruals and partitioning variables when testing the positive accounting theories hypotheses. In earnings management detection tests, it is common for researchers to use variables which partition their sample into two groups, for which differences in motivation for income manipulation are predicted. Since earnings management stimuli are assumed to be correlated with variables like firm performance, leverage or size, the use of these proxies are popular in empirical tests of positive accounting theories hypotheses. The correlation between non-discretionary accruals and the partitioning variable implies that part of the variation of non-discretionary accruals is generated by the partitioning variable. If accruals model does not control for the correlation, this part will be added to the discretionary accruals. In this study, we provide evidence that, when correlation between non-discretionary accruals and the above-mentioned partitioning variables remains uncontrolled, accrual-based models tend to generate measurement error in the estimate of discretionary accruals that significantly affects the sign and the magnitude of correlation between discretionary accruals and the partitioning variables. The findings of a Monte Carlo simulation also indicate that the Jones model relatively generates less type I error when it is adjusted to control for the relation between non-discretionary accruals and firm performance.
Mahmoud Lari Dashtbayaz; Mohammad Javad Saei; Arash Ghorbani
Abstract
In this study, using a sample consisting of 2702 firm-year observations of firms listed in Tehran Stock Exchange, which their data were obtained for a period of 11 years from 1382 to 1392, we investigate whether firms with small pre-managed negative earnings, manage their income through real earnings ...
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In this study, using a sample consisting of 2702 firm-year observations of firms listed in Tehran Stock Exchange, which their data were obtained for a period of 11 years from 1382 to 1392, we investigate whether firms with small pre-managed negative earnings, manage their income through real earnings manipulation to avoid losses or not. The implication of behavioral studies suggests zero earnings threshold might function as an important psychological reference for which managers have strong incentive to beat or exceed it and they are likely to engage in activities like offering customers price discounts to temporally increase sales, overproduction to lower cost of goods sold and decreasing discretionary expenditures to improve earnings reported to stakeholders. Our initial findings documented a significant discontinuity and irregularity in the pooled cross-sectional empirical distributions of earnings scaled by the total assets in intervals close to zero. Despite the evidence was consistent with earnings management explanation, other statistical findings did not provide evidence and support the prediction that managers boosted their income through activities like unusual sales discounts, overproduction, and cutting discretionary expenses to meet the earnings threshold
